Rouphael v. Khamisi, Civil No. 8:24-cv-01556-WFJ-SPF (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2025), is a 2025 decision from the Middle District of Florida involving enforcement of USCIS Form I-864, Affidavit of Support and I-864A Household Member Contract. The plaintiff, Antoine Abou Rouphael, sued his spouse, Karen Khamisi, and her father, Andrawos Khamisi, seeking support under the Form I-864 and Form I-864A. Karen Khamisi had signed the Form I-864 as the immigration sponsor, and Andrawos Khamisi had signed a Form I-864A as a household member.
The case came before the court on the defendants’ second motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that the case was barred by res judicata because an earlier I-864 enforcement action between the parties had been dismissed with prejudice. They also argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Andrawos Khamisi.
The court reached a mixed result. It allowed the claim against Karen Khamisi to proceed, but dismissed Andrawos Khamisi for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Why This Decision Matters
The most important pro-plaintiff part of Rouphael is the court’s treatment of claim preclusion.
The plaintiff had already brought an earlier I-864 enforcement case. That prior case settled and was dismissed with prejudice. The defendants argued that the new lawsuit was therefore barred by res judicata.
The court disagreed, at least as to alleged breaches occurring after the earlier case ended. The court held that claims for later breaches of the I-864 obligation were not the same cause of action as claims that had already accrued in the prior case. As the court explained, “a lawsuit for a breach of contract [for I-864 support obligations] that occurred in the past is not the same thing as—and will not bar—a lawsuit for a breach of contract that occurred after the initial lawsuit was commenced.”
That is a useful holding for sponsored immigrants. It recognizes the continuing nature of the I-864 support obligation. A sponsored immigrant who resolves or litigates one period of unpaid support is not necessarily barred from later enforcing support obligations that accrue after the first case.
The court stated the point even more directly later in the opinion: “Defendants could not have breached any federal duty to support Plaintiff for a temporal interval that had not yet occurred.” That matters because I-864 support claims accrue over time. A sponsor’s obligation may continue for years after divorce, separation, or even after an earlier lawsuit.
For sponsored immigrants, this is important. A prior settlement, dismissal, or judgment may resolve past support claims, but it does not automatically eliminate future I-864 obligations. Whether a later case is barred will depend on what claims were resolved, what time period was covered, and whether the new claim is based on later-accruing support obligations.
The decision is also important because of its discussion of personal jurisdiction over a Form I-864A household member. The court distinguished between Karen Khamisi, the I-864 sponsor, and Andrawos Khamisi, the I-864A household member.
The plaintiff argued that the Form I-864 contains a forum-selection or jurisdictional-consent provision. But the court emphasized that the Form I-864A is different. The court stated that the household member’s Form I-864A did not contain the same “forum selection” clause as the sponsor’s Form I-864. That distinction became central to the dismissal of the household member.
The court found that Florida’s long-arm statute was satisfied, at least at the pleading stage. (Long-arm statutes give state courts the ability to exercise jurisdiction over individuals in other states). The alleged contract required support payments to be made to a plaintiff in Florida, and the court accepted that this was enough under Florida’s long-arm statute.
But the court held that this was not enough to satisfy constitutional due process. The court found that Andrawos Khamisi had not purposefully availed himself of Florida. He lived in Pennsylvania, had lived there for decades, had only visited Florida twice to see grandchildren, and had not lived, worked, owned property, or conducted business in Florida.
On that record, the court held that merely signing the Form I-864A, and later allegedly failing to make support payments to someone who had moved to Florida, did not create sufficient minimum contacts with Florida. The court also reasoned that the Form I-864A warning about joint and several liability did not make it reasonably foreseeable that the household member could be sued in Florida.
That makes Rouphael a mixed decision. The res judicata ruling is helpful for sponsored immigrants. The personal-jurisdiction ruling is helpful to an I-864A household member defendant.
But there is an important caution about the personal-jurisdiction ruling: the court does not appear to have addressed 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(c)(2)(i)(C)(2). That regulation specifically states that each person who signs an “affidavit of support attachment” agrees to submit to the personal jurisdiction of any court that has subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil suit to enforce the contract or affidavit of support.
That matters because the regulations use the phrase “affidavit of support attachment” to refer to the household-member contract. In practical terms, that is the Form I-864A. So while the court treated the Form I-864 and Form I-864A differently for personal-jurisdiction purposes, the regulation itself does not appear to make the same distinction. The regulation says that the personal-jurisdiction consent applies to individuals who sign an affidavit of support attachment.
This does not mean the Rouphael court necessarily reached the wrong result on the arguments presented. The issue may not have been squarely raised by the plaintiff. But it does mean that the personal-jurisdiction ruling should be read carefully. The decision leaves room for a future plaintiff to argue that an I-864A household member has already consented to personal jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(c)(2)(i)(C)(2), even if the text of the Form I-864A itself does not contain the same forum-selection language as the Form I-864.
That is the more nuanced lesson. Rouphael is a warning that plaintiffs must be careful when suing I-864A household members. But it is not the final word on whether household members have consented to personal jurisdiction. The regulatory argument remains available for another case.
Practical Takeaways
- A prior I-864 lawsuit does not necessarily bar a later lawsuit for later-accruing support obligations. If the sponsor breaches the support duty after the earlier case ended, the sponsored immigrant may still have a new claim.
- Settlement agreements and dismissal orders should be drafted carefully. If a case resolves only past support, the documents should avoid language that could be read as releasing future I-864 claims.
- Sponsors should not assume that a dismissal with prejudice automatically ends future I-864 exposure. Unless a terminating event has occurred, the support obligation may continue.
- Sponsored immigrants should separate past damages from future or later-accruing damages when evaluating claim preclusion issues.
- A Form I-864 sponsor and a Form I-864A household member may raise different litigation issues, especially if the plaintiff relies only on the language of the forms themselves.
- Plaintiffs suing an I-864A household member should consider both the form language and the regulations. In particular, 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(c)(2)(i)(C)(2) appears to provide a separate basis for arguing that a household member consented to personal jurisdiction.
- Before suing an I-864A household member, plaintiffs should analyze where that household member lives, what contacts the household member has with the forum state, whether the household member initiated any relevant relationship with the forum, and whether the household member consented to jurisdiction by signing an affidavit of support attachment.
- Family lawyers handling divorce cases involving immigrant spouses should be careful not to assume that resolving support issues in one case necessarily resolves all future I-864 obligations.
Limits and Cautions
Rouphael is a federal district court decision, not appellate authority. It is useful, but it is not binding nationwide.
The decision is also mixed. It is favorable to sponsored immigrants on res judicata because it recognizes that later I-864 breaches can support a later lawsuit. But it is unfavorable to sponsored immigrants on personal jurisdiction over an I-864A household member.
The personal-jurisdiction ruling should be read with caution. The court focused on the absence of a forum-selection clause in the Form I-864A and on the household member’s limited contacts with Florida. But the court does not appear to have addressed the regulation providing that a person who signs an affidavit of support attachment agrees to submit to personal jurisdiction in any court with subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil suit to enforce the contract or affidavit of support.
That means Rouphael may be best understood as a case about the arguments made and the record presented, not as a definitive ruling that I-864A household members never consent to personal jurisdiction. A future case that squarely raises 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(c)(2)(i)(C)(2) could come out differently.
The ruling is also fact-specific. The court relied on the household member’s limited contacts with Florida, the fact that he lived in Pennsylvania, the absence of evidence that he conducted business or owned property in Florida, and the court’s view that the Form I-864A did not itself contain the same forum-selection clause as the Form I-864.
The decision does not mean that I-864A household members cannot be sued. It means plaintiffs should plead and brief personal jurisdiction carefully, including any regulatory basis for consent to jurisdiction.
